First best implementation with costly information acquisition


Larionov, Daniil ; Pham, Hien ; Yamashita, Takuro ; Zhu, Shuguang


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URL: https://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp22064.pdf
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-640228
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2022
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 22-064
Place of publication: Mannheim
Edition: November 15, 2022
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences - CDSE (Economics)
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: We study mechanism design with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and four or more agents, sharing a common prior over the set of payoff-relevant states. The principal proposes a mechanism to the agents who can then acquire information about the state of the world by privately designing a signal device. As long as it is costless for each agent to acquire a signal that is independent from the state, we show that there exists a mechanism which allows the principal to implement any social choice rule at zero information acquisition cost to the agents.




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