Mandated Benefits, Welfare, and Heterogeneous Firms


Addison, John T. ; Barret, C. R. ; Siebert, W. S.


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/650
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-6505
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 1998
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Subject headings (SWD): Regierung , Kündigungsschutz , Arbeitsverhältnis , Arbeiter
Abstract: The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers' insurance, and may also redistribute in favor of more "deserving" workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market contracts - separating the various worker types - the more likely it is that such output effects will on balance serve to reduce welfare. It is shown that adverse effects can be mitigated by restricting mandates to "large" firms. An alternative to a mandate is direct government provision. We demonstrate that direct government provision may be superior to mandates by virtue of preserving separations.
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Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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Addison, John T. ; Barret, C. R. ; Siebert, W. S. (1998) Mandated Benefits, Welfare, and Heterogeneous Firms. Open Access [Working paper]
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