Committees and Special Interests


Felgenhauer, Mike ; Grüner, Hans Peter


URL: http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp293.pdf
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2003
The title of a journal, publication series: Working Paper Series / European Central Bank
Volume: 293
Place of publication: Frankfurt, M.
ISSN: 1561-0810 , 1725-2806
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > VWL, Wirtschaftspolitik (Grüner)
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: Some committees convene behind closed doors while others publicly discuss issues and make their decisions. This paper studies the role of open and closed committee decision making in presence of external influence. We show that restricting the information of interest groups may reduce the bias towards special interest politics. Moreover, there are cases where benefits from increasing the number of decision makers can only be reaped if the committee's sessions are not public. In open committees benefits from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote is pivotal. As the number of voters increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This is not the case in a closed committee where costs and benefits of insincere voting only arise when a voter is pivotal.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




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Felgenhauer, Mike ; Grüner, Hans Peter (2003) Committees and Special Interests. Working Paper Series / European Central Bank Frankfurt, M. 293 [Working paper]


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