corporate governance , institutional investors , failure tolerance , innovation , short selling , CEO turnover , gender economics , role models , gender gap , tournament entry , competition
Abstract:
This dissertation comprises two empirical papers on corporate governance and one on gender economics. Using a new measure for institutional investors’ failure tolerance, the first paper finds that firms with more failure-tolerant institutional investors exhibit significantly higher levels of innovation, measured as citation-weighted patents, even when controlling for firm and institutional heterogeneity. This challenges the notion that institutional investors promote short-term thinking. The second paper investigates the effects of short selling on CEO turnover. We find evidence that short selling contains private information about the quality of the CEO-firm match. Exploiting exogenous variation in the possibility of selling short, the paper finds that unrestricted short selling increases the probability of forced turnovers for large firms and makes forced turnovers more sensitive to short sales, but not stock prices. Using an online survey experiment, the third paper finds that the gender gap in tournament entry found in previous studies disappears if subjects are exposed to a competitive female role model while seeing a male role model increases the gap.
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