Destructive behavior in competitive settings: motives and mitigation mechanisms

Stäbler, Jonathan

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URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-675054
Dokumenttyp:	Dissertation
Erscheinungsjahr:	2024
Ort der Veröffentlichung:	Mannheim
Hochschule:	Universität Mannheim
Gutachter:	Orzen, Henrik
Datum der mündl. Prüfung:	15 Juli 2024
Sprache der Veröffentlichung:	Englisch
Einrichtung:	Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > GESS - CDSE (VWL) Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre > Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung (Orzen 2009-)
Fachgebiet:	330 Wirtschaft
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch):	sabotage , group size uncertainty , disclosure policy , litigation , fee-shifting rule , spiteful preferences , social norms , third-party punishment
Abstract:	This dissertation consists of three independent chapters, which are broadly connected to destructive behavior in competitive settings and ways how to mitigate it. Specifically, in Chapter 1, I analyze contests, where players can sabotage each other and investigate whether a designer should disclose the number of competitors when there is uncertainty about the group size. Chapter 2 focuses on a competitive litigation setting. It investigates whether and how spiteful preferences contribute to excessive litigation expenditures and how the choice of the fee-shifting rule can mitigate such behavior. Chapter 3 moves from destructive behavior in competitive settings to analyzing a mitigation mechanism for selfish behavior more broadly. In particular, it explores the occurrence of informal punishment from third parties and studies whether perceptions of social norms are motives for such punitive actions. While it does not study this mechanism specifically for destructive behavior in competitive settings, it nonetheless can inform the occurrence of informal sanctioning as a mitigation mechanism in such environments.