Capital Control, Debt Financing and Innovative Activity


Czarnitzki, Dirk ; Kraft, Kornelius


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/925
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-9258
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2004
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: O32 O31 L11 C25 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Deutschland , Innovation , Innovationsbereitschaft , Patent , Führungskraft
Abstract: The present paper first discusses theoretically the different incentives of manager- versus owner-controlled firms for investment into innovative activity. In addition, the role of debt financing is analyzed. Subsequently the results from an empirical study on the determinants of innovative activity measured by patent applications are presented. A sample of German firms covering 2,793 observations is used, and it turns out that companies with widely held capital stock are more active in innovation, i.e. weakly controlled managers show a higher innovation propensity. However, the higher the leverage the more disciplined the managers are.
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Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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Czarnitzki, Dirk ; Kraft, Kornelius (2004) Capital Control, Debt Financing and Innovative Activity. Open Access [Working paper]
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