Network Formation

Groh, Christian

Additional URL:;jses...
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2001
The title of a journal, publication series: GK Working Paper Series
Volume: 01-04
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Graduiertenkolleg VWL/BWL
Subject: 330 Economics
Abstract: I study a network based mechanism of norm enforcement in a community where agents play a Prisoner’s Dilemma with changing partners. Agents may choose a number of close friends. Communication to close friends within the network enforces cooperation. In a world with noiseless communication, it is optimal that each agent has close contacts to all other network members. Moreover, it is optimal to have a huge network size. If communication is noisy a lower number of close contacts is optimal. As the number of network members gets large and network members receive noisy information from all network members, norm enforcement fails.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

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