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Zitation

Gruppieren nach: Erscheinungsjahr | Autoren | Keine Sortierung
Anzahl der Einträge: 25.

Gall, Thomas (2003) Lotteries, Inequality, and Market Imperfection : Galor and Zeira Go Gambling. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 03-01 [Arbeitspapier]

Vogelgesang, Ulrike (2001) Investigating Microfinance: Caja Los Andes, Bolivia. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 01-01 [Arbeitspapier]

Vogelgesang, Ulrike (2001) Microfinance in Times of Crisis: The Effects of Competition, Rising Indebtedness, and Economic Crisis on Repayment Behaviour. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 01-06 [Arbeitspapier]

Glaser, Markus ; Weber, Martin (2001) Momentum and Turnover: Evidence from the German Stock Market. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 01-07 [Arbeitspapier]

Groh, Christian (2001) Network Formation. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 01-04 [Arbeitspapier]

Vogelgesang, Ulrike (2001) The impact of microfinance loans on the clients' enterprises: Evidence from Caja Los Andes, Bolivia. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 01-03 [Arbeitspapier]

Groh, Christian (2001) Who Wants to be a Millionaire: Are simple questions optimal? GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 01-05 [Arbeitspapier]

Zimper, Alexander (2000) A Remark On D. Bernheim's Sufficiency Condition For The Uniqueness Of Rationalizable Strategy Profiles. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 00-05 [Arbeitspapier]

Weiss, Matthias (2000) Employment Effects of Skill-Biased Technical Change When Benefits are Linked to Indices of Standards of Living. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 00-02 [Arbeitspapier]

Cherdron, Malte (2000) Interconnection, Termination-Based Price Discrimination, and Network Competition in a Mature Telecommunications Market. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 00-03 [Arbeitspapier]

Szalay, Dezsö (2000) Optimal Delegation. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 00-01 [Arbeitspapier]

Zimper, Alexander (2000) Rational Preference Orderings With A Discontinuity Structure. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 00-04 [Arbeitspapier]

Barth, Jörn (1999) A Simple Credit Risk Model with Individual and Collective Components. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 99-01 [Arbeitspapier]

Groh, Christian (1999) Bargaining Power in Repeated Negotiations with Outside Options. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 99-08 [Arbeitspapier]

Groh, Christian (1999) The Effects of Competition on Bargaining Power in Repeated Bilateral Negotiations. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 99-05 [Arbeitspapier]

Barth, Jörn (1999) Credit Risk : Worst Case Scenarios of Homogenic Swap Portfolios. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 99-02 [Arbeitspapier]

Szalay, Dezsö (1999) Financial Contracting, R&D and Growth. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 99-03 [Arbeitspapier]

Ludden, Ulrike (1999) Optimal Capital Income Taxation and Redistribution. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 99-10 [Arbeitspapier]

Scheuermann, Ingo F. (1999) Optimal financing contracts for vertical R&D alliances in presence of competing beneficaries. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 99-07 [Arbeitspapier]

Scheuermann, Ingo F. (1999) Segmentation in the German market for venture capital. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 99-06 [Arbeitspapier]

Groh, Christian (1999) Sequential Moves and Comparative Statics in Strategic Market Games. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 99-04 [Arbeitspapier]

Scheuermann, Ingo F. (1999) The incentive effects of call provisions in venture capital contracts. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 99-09 [Arbeitspapier]

Ruckes, Martin ; Rheinbaben, Joachim von (1997) A Firms Optimal Number of Bank Relationships and the Extend of Information Disclosure. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 97-01 [Arbeitspapier]

Rheinbaben, Joachim von (1997) Intertemporal Renegotiation in Prinzipal-agent Problems. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 97-02 [Arbeitspapier]

Pfister, Dirk ; Ruckes, Martin ; Scharf, Christian (1996) Why the Ownership Structure of Specialist Rights Matters for Investors. GK Working Paper Series Mannheim 96-01 [Arbeitspapier]

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