Essays in mechanism design

Rosar, Frank

Vorschau

PDF
rosar.pdf - Veröffentlichte Version
Download (846kB)

URL:	https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2140
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-21408
Dokumenttyp:	Dissertation
Erscheinungsjahr:	2007
Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe:	None
Ort der Veröffentlichung:	Mannheim
Hochschule:	Universität Mannheim
Gutachter:	Stahl, Konrad
Datum der mündl. Prüfung:	18 Dezember 2007
Sprache der Veröffentlichung:	Englisch
Einrichtung:	Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre > VWL, Mikroökonomik (Stahl K.1988-2009, Em)
Fachgebiet:	330 Wirtschaft
Normierte Schlagwörter (SWD):	Auktionstheorie , Kollektiventscheidung
Freie Schlagwörter (Deutsch):	Mechanismus-Design , Beschaffungsprozesse
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch):	mechanism design , collective decisions , auction theory , procurement
Abstract:	This thesis consists of three self-contained essays on mechanism design problems: a collective decision problem, a theoretical auction problem, and an applied auction problem. Chapter 1 contains an introduction. In Chapter 2 I consider a problem where a group has to take a collective decision. I study how the decision mechanism should be designed when the information relevant for the decision is dispersed among the group members and when the group members' preferences over decisions might be in conflict. Observed mechanisms differ in whether the most extreme positions are disregarded or not. I find that the designer should never disregard the most extreme positions, but that he should limit the amount by which single group members can affect the decision. In Chapter 3 I analyze a seller's problem to design an optimal first-price auction. Normally the design problem reduces to the problem of determining the lowest admissible bid. I show that the structure of the optimal first-price auction may be non-standard when the seller cannot commit to sell to the highest bidder after observing the bids, and when he is able to fix the auction rules already at a time at which he is still uncertain about his own use value. In this case the seller might allow high and low bids, but forbid intermediate ones. In the last chapter I am interested in the problem of a procurer to organize his procurement process. I compare two procurement systems resembling stylized facts from American and Japanese procurement. In the first system the procurer exerts as much competitive pressure on his incumbent supplier as possible, while in the second system he protects his incumbent supplier by looking only for possible replacements after bilateral negotiations with him break down. I show that either system may induce higher relationship-specific investments and I describe under which conditions which of the two systems is preferable from the procurer's point of view.
Übersetzter Titel:	Aufsätze über Mechanismus-Design (Deutsch)
Übersetzung des Abstracts:	Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus drei Aufsätzen zu Mechanismus-Design-Problemen. Kapitel 1 beinhaltet die Einleitung. In Kapitel 2 untersuche ich ein kollektives Entscheidungsproblem und in den Kapiteln 2 und 3 betrachte ich ein theoretisches und ein angewandtes Auktionsproblem. (Deutsch)
Zusätzliche Informationen: