A note on the equivalence of rationalizability concepts in generalized nice games


Zimper, Alexander


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2741
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-27411
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2004
The title of a journal, publication series: None
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: C72 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Theorie , Nichtkooperatives Spiel , Rationalismus
Keywords (English): Rationalizability , dominance solutions , nice games
Abstract: Moulin (1984) describes the class of nice games for which the solution concept of point-rationalizability coincides with iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies. As a consequence nice games have the desirable property that all rationalizability concepts determine the same strategic solution. However, nice games are characterized by rather strong assumptions. For example, only single-valued best responses are admitted and the individual strategy sets have to be convex and compact subsets of the real line R1. This note shows that equivalence of all rationalizability concepts can be extended to multi-valued best response correspondences. The surprising finding is that equivalence does not hold for individual strategy sets that are compact and convex subsets of Rn with n≥1.
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