Partnerschaftsgesellschaft , Unternehmensbewertung , Verhandlungstheorie , Asymmetrische Information , Auktionstheorie
Abstract:
In a symmetric independent private values setting a sealed-bid double auction dissolves a partnership efficiently. This well known result remains valid in a model with interdependent valuations. However, if common values components are large agents might prefer not to participate in a double auction. Therefore a simple extention of the rules of double-auctions is suggested that ensures participation. Even though these modified double auctions are not incentive efficient, they still realize gains from trade and can be implemented without knowledge about the specifications of the model.
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