Last minute policies and the incumbency advantage

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URL:	https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/37189
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-371899
Dokumenttyp:	Arbeitspapier
Erscheinungsjahr:	2014
Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe:	Working Paper Series
Band/Volume:	14-24
Ort der Veröffentlichung:	Mannheim
Sprache der Veröffentlichung:	Englisch
Einrichtung:	Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre > VWL, Verhaltensökonomik (Juniorprofessur) (Pencynski 2011-2017)
MADOC-Schriftenreihe:	Department of Economics > Working Paper Series
Fachgebiet:	330 Wirtschaft
Fachklassifikation:	JEL: D72 , D82 , D60,
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch):	Incumbency advantage , electoral competition , information revelation , agenda setting
Abstract:	This paper models a purely informational mechanism behind the incumbency advantage. In a two-period electoral campaign with two policy issues, a specialized incumbent and an unspecialized, but possibly more competent challenger compete for election by voters who are heterogeneously informed about the state of the world. Due to the asymmetries in government responsibility between candidates, the incumbent's statement may convey information on the relevance of the issues to voters. In equilibrium, the incumbent sometimes strategically releases his statement early and thus signals the importance of his signature issue to the voters. We find that, since the incumbent's positioning on the issue reveals private information which the challenger can use in later statements, the incumbent's incentives to distort the campaign are decreasing in his quality, as previously documented by the empirical literature. The distortions arising in equilibrium are decreasing in the incumbent's effective ability; however, the distortions may be increasing in the incumbent's reputation of expertise on his signature issue.