Last minute policies and the incumbency advantage


Manzoni, Elena ; Penczynski, Stefan P.


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URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/37189
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-371899
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2014
The title of a journal, publication series: Working Paper Series
Volume: 14-24
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > VWL, Verhaltensökonomik (Juniorprofessur) (Penczynski 2011-)
MADOC publication series: Department of Economics > Working Paper Series
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D72 , D82 , D60,
Keywords (English): Incumbency advantage , electoral competition , information revelation , agenda setting
Abstract: This paper models a purely informational mechanism behind the incumbency advantage. In a two-period electoral campaign with two policy issues, a specialized incumbent and an unspecialized, but possibly more competent challenger compete for election by voters who are heterogeneously informed about the state of the world. Due to the asymmetries in government responsibility between candidates, the incumbent's statement may convey information on the relevance of the issues to voters. In equilibrium, the incumbent sometimes strategically releases his statement early and thus signals the importance of his signature issue to the voters. We find that, since the incumbent's positioning on the issue reveals private information which the challenger can use in later statements, the incumbent's incentives to distort the campaign are decreasing in his quality, as previously documented by the empirical literature. The distortions arising in equilibrium are decreasing in the incumbent's effective ability; however, the distortions may be increasing in the incumbent's reputation of expertise on his signature issue.

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Manzoni, Elena ; Penczynski, Stefan P. (2014) Last minute policies and the incumbency advantage. Open Access Working Paper Series Mannheim 14-24 [Working paper]
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