When and how the punishment must fit the crime

Mailath, George J. ; Nocke, Volker ; White, Lucy

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URL:	https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/37483
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-374834
Document Type:	Working paper
Year of publication:	2015
The title of a journal, publication series:	Working Paper Series
Volume:	15-04
Place of publication:	Mannheim
Publication language:	English
Institution:	School of Law and Economics > VWL, Mikroökonomik (Nocke 2009-)
MADOC publication series:	Department of Economics > Working Paper Series
Subject:	330 Economics
Classification:	JEL: C70 , C72 , C73,
Keywords (English):	Simple Penal Code , Subgame Perfect Equilibrium , Repeated Extensive Game , Optimal Punishment
Abstract:	In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu,1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of settings in which a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation play after a deviation is tailored not only to the identity of the deviator, but also to the nature of the deviation.

	Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.
	Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

BASE: Mailath, George J. ; Nocke, Volker ; White, Lucy

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ORCID: Mailath, George J., Nocke, Volker

and White, Lucy

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