To tell or not to tell : Essays on corporate financial disclosure

Zhang, Li

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20150525_Li_Zhang_Diss_Master_Pub.pdf - Veröffentlichte Version
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URL:	https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/38971
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-389710
Dokumenttyp:	Dissertation
Erscheinungsjahr:	2015
Ort der Veröffentlichung:	Mannheim
Hochschule:	Universität Mannheim
Gutachter:	Simons, Dirk
Datum der mündl. Prüfung:	11 Mai 2015
Sprache der Veröffentlichung:	Englisch
Einrichtung:	Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaftslehre > ABWL u. Rechnungswesen (Simons 2004-)
Fachgebiet:	330 Wirtschaft
Normierte Schlagwörter (SWD):	Rechnungslegung , Publizität , Publizitätspflicht , Spieltheorie , Asymmetrische Information , Vollstreckung , Signaling
Freie Schlagwörter (Deutsch):	Offenlegung , freiwillige Offenlegung , verpflichtende Offenlegung , Lesbarkeit der textuellen Offenlegung , Sentiment der textuellen Offenlegung , Normdurchsetzung , Publizitätsvorschrift
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch):	accounting , financial disclosure , disclosure regulation , mandatory disclosure , voluntary disclosure , game theory , asymmetric information , enforcement , signaling theory , textual sentiment , textual readability
Abstract:	This cumulative dissertation focuses on the topic corporate financial disclosure and explores several aspects of its function in mitigating information asymmetry. It consists of three individual essays, each of which focuses on one aspect regarding management’s disclosure decision. The first essay centers around the fundamental question, under which conditions the management voluntarily discloses private information. In particular, it explores the impact of information quality on such a decision. The second essay incorporates multiple dimensions of the textual disclosure such as quantity, readability and sentiment. Particularly, it investigates the possible interdependency of the management’s decision due to the different degree of decision discretion each of the dimensions brings. While the first two essays focus on voluntary disclosure, the third essay shifts the focus to the mandatory disclosure. It provides an explanation for the empirically observed positive relation between the enforcement effectiveness and the strictness of mandatory disclosure regulation in many economies