To tell or not to tell : Essays on corporate financial disclosure

Zhang, Li

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URL:	https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/38971
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-389710
Document Type:	Doctoral dissertation
Year of publication:	2015
Place of publication:	Mannheim
University:	Universität Mannheim
Evaluator:	Simons, Dirk
Date of oral examination:	11 May 2015
Publication language:	English
Institution:	Business School > ABWL u. Rechnungswesen (Simons 2004-)
Subject:	330 Economics
Subject headings (SWD):	Rechnungslegung , Publizität , Publizitätspflicht , Spieltheorie , Asymmetrische Information , Vollstreckung , Signaling
Individual keywords (German):	Offenlegung , freiwillige Offenlegung , verpflichtende Offenlegung , Lesbarkeit der textuellen Offenlegung , Sentiment der textuellen Offenlegung , Normdurchsetzung , Publizitätsvorschrift
Keywords (English):	accounting , financial disclosure , disclosure regulation , mandatory disclosure , voluntary disclosure , game theory , asymmetric information , enforcement , signaling theory , textual sentiment , textual readability
Abstract:	This cumulative dissertation focuses on the topic corporate financial disclosure and explores several aspects of its function in mitigating information asymmetry. It consists of three individual essays, each of which focuses on one aspect regarding management’s disclosure decision. The first essay centers around the fundamental question, under which conditions the management voluntarily discloses private information. In particular, it explores the impact of information quality on such a decision. The second essay incorporates multiple dimensions of the textual disclosure such as quantity, readability and sentiment. Particularly, it investigates the possible interdependency of the management’s decision due to the different degree of decision discretion each of the dimensions brings. While the first two essays focus on voluntary disclosure, the third essay shifts the focus to the mandatory disclosure. It provides an explanation for the empirically observed positive relation between the enforcement effectiveness and the strictness of mandatory disclosure regulation in many economies