Essays on financial frictions in macroeconomics

Pöschl, Johannes

Dissertation_Poeschl.pdf - Published

Download (1MB)

URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-438600
Document Type: Doctoral dissertation
Year of publication: 2017
Place of publication: Mannheim
University: Universität Mannheim
Evaluator: Adam, Klaus
Date of oral examination: 21 November 2017
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > VWL, Internat. Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (Adam)
Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences - CDSE (Economics)
Subject: 330 Economics
Subject headings (SWD): Makroökonomie
Keywords (English): Financial Frictions , Macroeconomics , Capital Structure , Bank Runs
Abstract: This dissertation consists of two chapters. In the first chapter, I study the dynamics of corporate debt maturity over the business cycle, and how the debt maturity structure of a firm matters for its investment decisions. I find that in the data, the corporate debt maturity structure is pro-cyclical, especially for small firms. Moreover, larger firms use more long-term debt in general. I construct a quantitative model to explain these findings. The main results are twofold: First, maturity dynamics can be explained by a trade-off between default incentives, which favor short-term debt, and roll-over costs, which favor long-term debt. Second, long-term debt can lead to substantial under-investment. In the second chapter, I study bank capital regulation in a model with endogenous bank runs. The model economy has both retail and shadow banks. Financial instability arises, because retail banks will occasionally run on shadow banks. The regulator faces a trade-off between reducing financial instability and ensuring that financial intermediation is efficient. I find that a dynamic capital requirement on retail banks is an effective policy instrument to reduce the frequency of bank runs, because it allows retail banks to build up a buffer during normal times that they can use to increase leverage capacity during a bank run. The cost of imposing a capital requirement is however high, if banks cannot issue external equity.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

Metadata export


+ Search Authors in

+ Download Statistics

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics

You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail

Actions (login required)

Show item Show item