social networks , learning , search , bargaining , experimentation , dynamic games , empirical games , bayes correlated equilibrium , partial identification
Abstract:
This dissertation consists of three research papers on dynamic games. All the
three papers focus on learning in strategic environments, but each of them is a
one-off exploration of a different topic. Chapter 1 investigates the impact of costly
information acquisition and choice on the process of social learning. Chapter 2
studies bargaining relationships in such an environment in which there is uncertainty
about whether and when superior outside opportunities are available and parties may
want to wait to reach an agreement in order to learn about their best opportunities
during negotiations. Chapter 3 proposes a simple estimation strategy when data
on strategic interaction are interpreted as the long-run result of a history of game
plays.
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