Tax compliance , randomized control trials , nudging , meta-analysis
Abstract:
Taxpayer nudges – behavioral interventions that aim to increase tax compliance without changing the underlying economic incentives of taxpayers – are used increasingly by governments because of their potential cost-effectiveness in raising tax revenue. We collect about a thousand treatment effect estimates from over 40 randomized controlled trials, and in a metaanalytical framework show that non-deterrence nudges – interventions pointing to elements of individual tax morale – are on average ineffective in curbing tax evasion, while deterrence nudges – interventions emphasizing traditional determinants of compliance such as audit probabilities and penalty rates – are potent catalysts of compliance. These effects are, however, fairly small in magnitude. Deterrence nudges increase the probability of compliance by only 1.5-2.5 percentage points more than non-deterrence nudges, while the effects are likely to be bound to the short-run, and are somewhat inflated by selective reporting of results.
Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.
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