Optimal auctions with signaling bidders


Bos, Olivier ; Pollrich, Martin


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URL: https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/58795
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-587956
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2020
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 20-091
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D44 , D82,
Keywords (English): Optimal auctions , revenue equivalence , Bayesian persuasion , information design
Abstract: The authors study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders’ care about winning the object and a receiver’s inference about their type. They reestablish revenue equivalence when bidders’ signaling concerns are linear, and the auction makes participation observable via an entry fee. With convex signaling concerns, optimal auctions are fully transparent: every standard auction, which reveals all bids yields maximal revenue. With concave signaling concerns there is no general revenue ranking. The authors highlight a trade-off between maximizing revenue derived from signaling, and extracting information from bidders. Their methodology combines tools from mechanism design with tools from Bayesian persuasion.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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